When bad rulers go, do their families face justice and is there reform? Six African case studies
When authoritarian rule ends, the leader may leave office, but the ruling family can remain politically consequential. My research focuses on authoritarianism and judicial politics in Africa. In a recent study, I examined why efforts to hold ruling families accountable took different legal forms. I also sought to understand why those didn’t necessarily lead to […]
When authoritarian rule ends, the leader may leave office, but the ruling family can remain politically consequential.
My research focuses on authoritarianism and judicial politics in Africa. In a recent study, I examined why efforts to hold ruling families accountable took different legal forms. I also sought to understand why those didn’t necessarily lead to changes in how countries were governed.
I compared experiences in six African countries: Angola, Gabon, Senegal, Egypt, Tunisia and The Gambia. I examined court rulings, official inquiries, government records and investigative reporting to trace the legal action taken against members of a ruling family after changes in leadership.
Some transitions resulted in imprisonment. Others led to prosecution in absentia, or financial and administrative sanctions. These forms of accountability can have very different political consequences.
Political transitions are often judged by what happens to the former ruler. What happens to the wider ruling family gets less attention. Prosecutions can signal a decisive break with the old guard. But they can also serve new political interests without changing the way power was accumulated.
My research shows that accountability is not the same as democratic transformation. Legal action can reconfigure elites while leaving important political institutions intact.
For example, members of the family of José Eduardo dos Santos ran Angola for 38 years. The prosecution of dos Santos’ son for fraud demonstrated a shift in political protection within the ruling elite, but the post-independence party remained in power.
In Gabon, the Bongo family ruled for 56 years even though they faced investigations and legal proceedings after changes in leadership.
Conversely, prosecutions can form part of wider processes of institutional change. In Tunisia, former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and members of his family were prosecuted in 2011. The country then introduced competitive elections and adopted a new constitution in 2014. These democratic gains proved fragile, however, as President Kais Saied began concentrating executive power in 2021.
Holding former leaders and their families accountable is not necessarily the same as changing the institutions that allowed them to accumulate power. A political transition may bring lasting change or simply reshape who holds influence. That matters when assessing the transition.
Three pathways of accountability
My research identifies three pathways for holding former ruling families accountable.
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Criminal prosecution in absentia: these are legal proceedings against family members who are outside the country or otherwise absent. In Tunisia, former president Ben Ali and his wife were sentenced to 35 years in prison in 2011 while living in exile in Saudi Arabia.
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Financial or administrative action: this includes measures like asset freezes, confiscations and sanctions. In The Gambia, investigations into former president Yahya Jammeh’s financial dealings led to asset recovery measures and sanctions.
Two other factors matter.
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Divisions within the ruling elite. These arise when powerful figures within a governing party or political establishment no longer share the same interests. In Angola, president Joao Lourenço investigated his predecessor’s family despite dos Santos still being part of the ruling party. The change in leadership weakened the former president’s political protection.
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International leverage. This refers to the ability of foreign governments and institutions to influence accountability. They do this through sanctions or control over assets held abroad. In The Gambia, US sanctions against the Jammeh family led to some justice even when domestic prosecution was difficult.
How accountability unfolded
The countries in my study illustrate how the different forms of accountability play out.
In Angola, proceedings against the dos Santos family show that judicial intervention is possible, even if the ruling party and wider political order remain largely intact.
In Tunisia, prosecutions went beyond the presidential family to former officials and security personnel. But the country’s initial democratic gains proved fragile. Tunisia shows why punishing past rulers and building durable checks on present rulers are separate challenges.
In The Gambia, authorities pursued accountability despite the former ruler and his family being outside the country. Jammeh lost the 2016 election and left for exile in 2017. The new government established the Janneh Commission in June 2017 to investigate Jammeh’s financial dealings. It concluded that the former president had illicitly obtained over US$360 million through public resources.
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The family was not brought before a domestic criminal court. Instead, authorities relied on asset recovery and administrative measures.
But they left one question unanswered: would the institutions that enabled the misuse of public resources be strong enough to constrain future leaders?
The three other cases in my study – Egypt, Senegal and Gabon – further illustrate the challenge in achieving meaningful political change in authoritarian states.
Egypt prosecuted former president Hosni Mubarak’s sons, Alaa and Gamal, in 2015. They were sentenced to three years in prison. However, the country’s powerful security institutions survived.
Senegal sentenced Karim Wade, the son of former president Abdoulaye Wade and a former government minister, to six years in prison in March 2015 over corruption. Aspects of the proceedings drew international criticism, however, including a UN finding that his detention was arbitrary.
Gabon prosecuted members of the Bongo family, which had ruled the country for 56 years, over financial crimes in November 2025. This was despite other powerful figures from the previous political establishment remaining influential.
The limits of the law
Across the six cases, I found that legal action was easier when leadership change weakened a family’s protection. Successors were also more likely to pursue legal action when they saw political advantages in doing so.
Whether defendants were within reach of domestic courts also shaped the form accountability took: imprisonment, convictions in their absence, or financial and administrative measures.
This doesn’t make every prosecution a political performance. Legal penalties can be genuine even when they benefit the new leadership. The question is whether accountability becomes a lasting rule rather than an instrument used against yesterday’s powerful family.