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Hormuz block hit Africa in 4 places: what the continent must do to prevent future shocks

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026, a result of America’s war with Iran, removed at its peak about a quarter of seaborne oil from its usual routes, together with a similar share of globally traded liquefied natural gas. Asia took the biggest hit, because it was the main destination for Hormuz barrels. […]

By The Conversation Africa

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026, a result of America’s war with Iran, removed at its peak about a quarter of seaborne oil from its usual routes, together with a similar share of globally traded liquefied natural gas.

Asia took the biggest hit, because it was the main destination for Hormuz barrels. The impact on Africa has been more complicated. The continent has felt the shock, but not through crude oil flows.

I am an economist who has spent more than three decades studying development, international and public economics. In a working paper, drawing on data from the US Energy Information Administration, the International Energy Agency, the World Bank and market sources, I set out how the Hormuz closure affected African trade. I find that the continent absorbed the shock in four ways:

  • higher prices for imported refined fuels such as diesel

  • higher fertiliser and food-system costs

  • higher freight and insurance costs, as cargo was diverted around the southern tip of Africa

  • strain on budgets and external accounts.

Africa’s trade resilience is constrained less by the physical absence of Gulf crude than by a structural mismatch. The continent exports two-thirds of the crude it produces while importing roughly three-fifths of the refined fuels it burns. It also depends on nitrogen and sulphur that transit the same chokepoint as Gulf oil. Nitrogen is the basis of urea and other fertilisers; sulphur becomes the sulphuric acid used to make phosphate fertiliser and to process copper and cobalt ores. Yet African governments have made scant effort to address these weaknesses.

In my view, building resilience is therefore a question of trade and industrial policy. Countries need to remove the obstacles to trade within the continent and hold stocks of fuel and of fertiliser inputs such as urea.

Africa hit on four fronts

Refined fuels. Africa imports about 61% of its refined-oil needs. Its refining capacity has fallen by about a fifth since 2000, to roughly 2% of world output. Meanwhile demand has kept climbing: the continent became a net importer of petroleum products in the mid-2000s, as fuel use outpaced investment in refineries.

That left countries exposed when Gulf products stopped flowing. Eritrea and Madagascar source about 90% of their oil from the Middle East, and Kenya about 77%. In the first months of the war, pump prices rose by about half in Ethiopia and about 30% in Tanzania, and Kenyan filling stations ran about a fifth short of supply. These were refined-product shocks: Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania have no working refinery of their own.

Fertilisers. The closure interrupted a large share of global nitrogen and sulphur trade. Urea prices facing African buyers rose from about US$480 to US$700 a tonne soon after the war began, according to Africa Confidential, a London-based newsletter on African politics and economics. Prices have since eased, but the damage will show up in the 2026-27 harvest if farmers apply less fertiliser.

Freight and insurance. Red Sea attacks had been pushing shipping around the Cape of Good Hope since late 2023. War-risk insurance premiums for Hormuz transits, about 0.25% of a ship’s value before the war, reached 7.5%-10% in July. Insurance costs on Gulf-China cargoes reached about four times their five-year average.

These costs fall on every African import that shares a hull or container slot with diverted cargo, and on African exporters. Among them are African garment makers, part of apparel supply chains facing higher fuel, freight and insurance costs. Kenyan avocado exporters, squeezed by higher freight and insurance costs, began the season with only trial shipments. Kenya’s flower growers estimated losses of about US$5.6 million in two months from delays and spoilage, as air freight rates climbed 70%-110%.

External accounts. The World Bank projected a 24% rise in energy prices and a 31% rise in fertiliser prices in 2026. Increases on that scale slow growth almost everywhere. It expects sub-Saharan Africa to grow by 4% this year, 0.3 percentage points below its January forecast.

Bloomberg Economics estimates that a US$20 rise in the oil price would worsen the current account of the Democratic Republic of Congo by more than 3% of GDP, and those of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania by close to 1% each. A wider deficit must be financed by running down foreign-exchange reserves or borrowing more. That weakens currencies, making imported fuel and food dearer still, feeding inflation and squeezing budgets.

Exporters such as Angola and Nigeria gained on crude. But they too paid more for refined products, wheat and fertiliser.

What would absorb the next shock

  1. Refine for the continent, not just the coast. Nigeria’s Dangote refinery near Lagos, Africa’s largest at 650,000 barrels a day, is necessary but not sufficient. If it runs on imported crude and sells mainly into Atlantic markets, it is a large coastal refinery, not a continental buffer. Governments should steer it towards African crude and African customers, through long-term supply contracts with fuel importers in east and southern Africa.

  2. Agree common fuel standards and rules of origin. Today diesel refined to one country’s specification may not be legal to sell in another. And unless the African Continental Free Trade Area’s rules of origin say clearly when fuel counts as African, it cannot claim the agreement’s benefits. Fixing both would let Nigerian, Ghanaian or Angolan fuel compete in east and southern Africa, offering not just a tariff preference but an avoided chokepoint.

  3. Tackle non-tariff barriers. More than 90% of tariff lines (individual product categories) under the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement have been agreed for removal. Yet trade between African countries is only about 14% of the continent’s total, against 58% within the European Union. The obstacles are slow border procedures, duplicated inspections and roadblocks. UN estimates put the gains to Africa from removing them at about US$20 billion a year, three to four times the gains from removing tariffs. When fuel and freight costs spike, every extra weighbridge stop and manual document check acts as an energy tax.

  4. Build shared reserves of fuel and fertiliser. No African country meets the International Energy Agency’s 90-day emergency oil-stock benchmark, which binds only agency members. Pooled reserves under regional blocs such as the East African Community would not have prevented the 2026 price spike. But they would probably have eased the physical shortages that produced fuel queues in east Africa.

  5. Don’t mistake rerouting for resilience. Planned pipelines from the Gulf to the Red Sea would, if completed, shield much of the Gulf’s exports from a future Hormuz closure, and bring transit income to Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti. But they would shift the risk to the Bab el-Mandeb strait, at the southern end of the Red Sea, and to the Suez Canal. Changing which waterway raises pump prices in Addis Ababa does not make Africa more resilient. Refining, trading and storing more of its own fuel and fertiliser would.

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